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The publication of treatises concerning the law of employment dis-
crimination, such as the one reviewed here, marks a new stage in the growth
of this branch of the law. A legal explosion has taken place in the field of
employment discrimination law, an area of practice which was virtually
non-existent a scant decade ago.' Employment discrimination complaints
are now being filed with the EEOC at the rate of more than 50,000 a year, 2
and some 4,000 employment discrimination cases were filed in the federal
district courts in fiscal year 1975.1
As employment discrimination law expands, more and more lawyers
will be involved. In the early volumes of fair employment practice reports,
one who had worked in the field could recognize counsel in most of the
cases. Today this is no longer true. Thousands of inexperienced lawyers are
coming into the field with a need for an initial exposure to what has quickly
become a complex discipline. This influx underlies the popularity of short
courses on employment discrimination and the need for well-organized
texts.
I.
In meeting this need, the Schiei-Grossman book is extraordinarily
successful. All of the leading cases are there. The litigation issues are
carefully spelled out, at least to the point of giving the working lawyer a
basis on which to approach specific problems. Thus, as a tool for lawyers
who need sufficient knowledge to begin a close analysis and disposition of a
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problem, the book is unique and admirable. I find only two weaknesses,
both of which are matters of emphasis rather than omission.
There seems to be an under-emphasis of the problems raised by Curtis
v. Loether4 and Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 5 with respect to the possibility for a jury trial under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, and the implications of that possibility for the conduct of
both plaintiff and defendant. Curtis held that the seventh amendment's
command that the right to jury trial be preserved "[i]n suits at common
law" applied to actions brought under section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.6 Both the majority in Curtis and Justice Rehnquist in his Albemarle
concurrence suggested that jury trial rights in employment discrimination
suits might depend in part upon the relief demanded by the plaintiff. 7 Thus,
plaintiffs may be tempted to eschew the opportunity for general damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and other laws8 in order to avoid a jury trial. The
implications of this problem are mentioned9 but not adequately explored in
the material.
A second and perhaps more serious objection is the under-emphasis on
prevention of suit and the settlement process. I fear that we may tend to give
lip service to the desirability of informal means of compliance while turning
Title VII into a lawyer's technical playground. 10 This is a mistake which
bodes ill for the broader effort to improve employment opportunities for
minorities and women. Litigation and settlement are inexorably linked in the
4. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
5. 422 U.S. 405, 441 (1975).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
7. While it specifically declined to express an opinion on the subject, the Curtis Court
deemed it "instructive" to contrast the provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act with the
analogous section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). 415
U.S. at 196-97. The stated ground for distinction was the 1968 Act's authorization of suits for
"actual and punitive damages," a traditional common-law remedy requiring a jury trial, as
opposed to the 1964 Act's restriction of allowable relief to "reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
Justice Rehnquist elaborated on the jury trial issue in his Albemarle concurrence. Address-
ing the remedial section of Title VII directly, he stated:
To the extent . . . that the District Court retains substantial discretion as to
whether or not to award backpay notwithstanding a finding of unlawful discrimina-
tion, the nature of the jurisdiction which the court exercises is equitable, and under
our cases neither party may demand a jury trial. To the extent that discretion is
replaced by awards which follow as a matter of course from a finding of wrongdoing,
the action of the court in making such awards could not be fairly characterized as
equitable,. . . and would quite arguably be subject to the provisions of the SeventhAmendment.
422 U.S. at 443.
8. There is an excellent discussion of state and common law remedies in chapter 23 of
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW.
9. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1010-11.
10. This is an old concern. See Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities: Incisive Administration orIndecisive Bureaucracy?, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46 (1973).
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actions of lawyers for the government, the plaintiff and the defendant. Any
large-scale effort to inform the bar, such as is undertaken in this book,
should pay more attention to the alternatives to litigation.
This issue is not completely ignored in the materials. For example, a
sound process for handling individual claims of discrimination in an infor-
mal manner is set out in chapter 18.11 One of the more interesting aspects of
the book is the emphasis in chapter 35 on Federal Rule 68, the offer-of-
judgment rule, which gives a defendant post-filing leverage to induce a
settlement. However, there is no thorough discussion of such questions as
the various formulas for measuring back pay, which are important in both
the litigation and the settlement contexts. There is some discussion of this
matter, but all lawyers, whether they represent the government, plaintiffs or
defendants, would benefit from a more extensive analysis of the various
proposals for measuring back pay which the courts have developed. The
nuts and bolts of the settlement process should be discussed as thoroughly as
the time for filing suit or the determination of an appropriate class.
H.
The dilemma of the legal analyst is that in order to organize a body of
law, it is necessary to classify materials. The classification system may then
itself influence the growth of the law by its emphasis on certain directions. If
there is a way of avoiding this dilemma, it lies in viewing court pronounce-
ments as statements of principles subject to further evolution, rather than as
rules of law set in concrete. This would lead a writer to be perhaps more
tentative and hesitant in the classification process than were the authors. Yet
such a hesitancy might have made the material less useful for the prac-
titioner.
Granting that a classification system is necessary, I have some reserva-
tions about the one utilized by the authors. Their theory is that discrimina-
tion can be divided into four categories-disparate treatment, the present
effects of past discrimination, adverse impact, and reasonable accommoda-
tion. The development of this theoretical structure accounts for the first
quarter of the treatise. However, late in the book they introduce a fifth
factor, motive or intent. In discussing the proof problems arising out of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,12 the authors write that
When approaching the proof or disproof of a disparate treatment
case, the ultimate focus of the inquiry, and thus the proof, is whether or
not the decision or action in question was 'racially premised.' In other
words, motivation and intent are the ultimate issue. . . in contrast to
11. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 524-30.
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Vol. 1977:279]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the two other theories of discrimination, which focus on the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.'1 3
Thus, "disparate treatment" is said to be a method of proving "evil
motive" rather than an independent category of discrimination.
I think that the classification and order of presentation chosen are
unfortunate. Discrimination would be more clearly understood and cases
more easily analyzed under a classification system which began with evil
intent, moved on to unequal or disparate treatment, and concluded with
adverse effect.14 Disparate treatment was viewed initially as a way of
proving evil motive, as the authors suggest. The adverse effect concept is a
new and important development in the field, which must be carefully
mastered by lawyers. I therefore applaud the authors' emphasis on Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. ,15 which they have placed first in the book. However, the
deferral of any discussion of evil motive as a basis for discrimination until
the latter part of the book is not helpful. Furthermore, I disagree with the
above-quoted suggestion that the "disparate treatment" concept of discrimi-
nation is no more than a way of proving evil motive. The authors were
correct in initially treating disparate treatment as discrimination, not as
evidence of something else; but in the passage quoted above, they take back
a good bit of what they had given.
I also have difficulty with the authors' classification of "reasonable
accommodation" as a separate category of discrimination applicable to
religion. 16 Most religious discrimination cases are readily analysable under
the adverse effect rule of Griggs. A policy which requires employees to
work on Saturdays has an adverse effect on those who are not able to do so
by virtue of religion. Unless the employer can demonstrate that business
necessity requires their attendance, he is in violation of the statute. If a less
drastic means of achieving his objective is available, the employer may not
utilize the more drastic means.17 The business necessity defense necessarily
encompasses the question of whether the employer could accommodate the
religious needs of his employees. In short, I believe the duty to "accommo-
date" is an implicit aspect of the business necessity defense, and not a
separate category of discrimination.
Is this simply an academic quibble or is it a more substantial question?
If Title VII is read as imposing a duty to accommodate in religious matters,
serious constitutional questions arise. 8 If the statute is read as imposing a
13. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 54 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
14. See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
15. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
16. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, ch. 7.
17. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
18. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case which may deal with such issues.
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duty not to discriminate, those constitutional questions are less momentous.
To avoid calling into question the validity of Title VII, it is important to use
a legal concept of discrimination which remains within the control of the
courts. Judges may adapt and shape that concept as the needs of the time
require. But if there is an independent duty to "accommodate," then
Congress has asserted an extraordinary and possibly unconstitutional power
to require an individual to modify his actions to fit the religious convictions
of his neighbors. Such a broad power is not required to eliminate religious
discrimination. I think that the long-term impact of treating religious accom-
modation as a separate category ill serves the cause of expanded employ-
ment opportunity.
Part V of the book, which separates the treatment of problems relating
to race and color, national origin, native Americans and sex, produces a
kind of redundancy, particularly in the sex area. I believe the concepts of
discrimination are equally applicable regardless of the particular basis in-
volved. If one understands this point, however, the material dealing with
various specific problems is well presented.
There are some problems arising from the continuous stream of Su-
preme Court decisions in the field. For example, Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co. ,19 which appears in full in the third discussion of seniority, 20
should (along with part of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody2 1) be the primary
case in the initial analysis of the seniority discrimination problem. I suspect
that the scheme of the book was set in concrete (if not in type) by the time
Franks was decided, and it was necessary to slot it somewhere. Because of
its importance, it should have been placed in the initial discussion of
seniority.
Efforts by unions and employers in a collective bargaining relationship
to eliminate discrimination have been taken into account by a number of
courts in apportioning liability between them. These decisions are intended
to encourage the parties in collective bargaining relationships to clean their
own house and are therefore important in any consideration of settlement.
The possibility of shifting liability to the other party by seeking the elimina-
tion of discrimination should have received greater emphasis than the
authors' indirect references to it in Chapter 19.22
These shortcomings do not detract from the value of the book as a
lawyer's guide through what has in a short time become a maze of law. The
Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381
(1976).
19. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
20. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 477.
21. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
22. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 565.
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book has a comprehensive index in which I was able to find relevant
research references to all the matters on which I would have wanted further
discussion. As a practitioner's guide through Title VII, in the best sense of
the phrase, it is an admirable product.
In..
In the preface to Employment Discrimination Law, the authors state
that they intended their book to be of "equal value to practitioner and
student." 2 3 The second goal was less successfully accomplished. I fear that
the student will fall to achieve a sense of direction and growth in the law
from the materials themselves. The absence of sociological, historical and
political science materials from the book detracts from its utility for the
study of the legal process in this infinitely fascinating and changing area of
human behavior. The book is more in line with traditional casebooks which
emphasize doctrinal developments, but I doubt that advanced law students
require another doctrinal course. Rather, they need to gain a broader under-
standing of the interrelationship between the legal system and other facets of
society. I know of no better field of law for teaching about that interrelation-
ship than this. The case materials, the historical materials, and economic
data lend themselves well to this study. That dimension is not present in this
book.
There may be a contradiction inherent in the very purpose of the
authors. I am not sure it is possible to prepare materials which are as
superbly designed as these for thoughtful practicing attorneys and which, at
the same time, will illuminate the underlying subject matter in ways that will
be of most value to law' students. The treatment of individual claims
revolving around McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green24 illustrates this
point. As a doctrinal treatment of discharge and refusal to hire cases, the
material is cogent and accurate. But in its evaluation of the historical sweep
of the period 1972 to 1976 in connection with the concept of "pretextuali-
ty," it falls to note that the Supreme Court has moved away from the
apparent rigidity of the prima facie case concept of McDonnell Douglas.
This is of little moment to busy practitioners who need to know what the rule
is. It is of great importance, however, to students who are seeking a sense of
the direction and growth of the law.
One other example may be in order. In connection with Washington v.
Davis,2 the authors suggest that the significance of the case lies in the
willingness of the Court "to accept professionally approved methods of
establishing job-relatedness despite noncompliance with the 1970 EEOC
23. Id. at xv.
24. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1147 et seq.
25. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Guidelines," 2 6 thereby pitting Washington v. Davis against Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody27 somewhat more directly than the Court believed that
it was doing.2" But Washington v. Davis can be analyzed as a case in which
the entry-level job (a seventeen-week assignment as a police trainee) was
subject to a written test which had been validated. The employer had not
validated the test with respect to the higher level job of policeman, but the
employer is not required under the EEOC Guidelines to validate tests for
higher level jobs. The normal posture for advocates of equal employment
opportunity would be to oppose an employer's effort to use entry level tests
which evaluated potential for performance at higher level jobs-a reversal
of the posture of the parties in Washington v. Davis. Questions such as
these are or should be grist of the law student's concern, and their absence
from this material makes the book less useful for teaching purposes.
Perhaps there is a legal equivalent of the Heisenberg principle. Perhaps
one must choose whether to isolate the legal system at a point in time and
see it in its manifold dimensions, which the authors have done admirably, or
to view it as an evolving institution which responds to the underlying
pressures, desires and needs of the society of which it is a part, thereby
sacrificing some clarity and precision.
I strongly recommend this book for practitioners, and intend to keep
my copy handy for those occasions when I function as a consultant. I also
strongly recommend the book as a ready reference work for law teachers
who may lack familiarity with some areas of employment discrimination
law; in particular I suggest reading the section dealing with litigation, which
is extraordinarily good. I would not recommend, however, that it be used by
law students where the objective is, or should be, an understanding of the
evolution of the legal system.
26. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 102.
27. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 250-51.
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